

TITLE: Historical Intelligence Documents

AUTHOR: The Editors

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# STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.



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*CIA's early days*

## **Historical Intelligence Documents**

*Editor's Note: The following reprints are part of a series designed to illustrate important events in the history of CIA.*

### **Document 1**

The first page of the minutes of the DCI's staff meeting on 23 September 1947, in which he announces the establishment of CIA.

### **Document 2**

The final issue of the *Daily Summary*, dated 20 February 1951. It was the intelligence digest prepared by CIA for President Truman. The *Current Intelligence Bulletin* (CIB) replaced it.

### **Document 3**

A note from President Truman to DCI Smith giving his reaction to the CIB.

## Documents

## Document 1

MINUTES OF STAFF MEETING

23 September 1947

9:00 AM

## PRESENT:

Director	- Rear Admiral Hillenkoetter
Executive Director	- Captain W. C. Ford
ICAPS	- Captain H. C. Doan
OCD	- Captain C. E. Olsen
OO	- Brig. General E. Sibert
ORE	Mr. George Carey
OSO	- Mr. Theodore Babbitt
Inspection & Security	Captain A.H. McCollum
Administration & Management	- Colonel Donald Galloway
General Counsel	- Colonel S. Edwards
Advisory Council	- Colonel L.T. Shannon
Secretary, NIA	Mr. L. R. Houston
Personal Ass't to the Director	Captain J. Finnegan
	- Mr. John S. Earman
	- Mr. R.A. Richard

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Next Review Date: 22 May 90	
Audit: <i>all</i>	Date: <i>22 May 90</i>

DIRECTOR:

We are now known as the Central Intelligence Agency. According to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, CIA became CIA the day following the date Mr. Forrestal was sworn in. Mr. Hill, Admiral Souers and the Director have not yet been sworn in -- this may take place today. Until such time as the Director is sworn in, certain provisions of the Act will not be put into effect, for instance, the section authorizing CIA to terminate employment of individuals found undesirable.

The Director wishes that we continue using our present letter-head stationery until supply is exhausted, as an economy measure.

Mr. Forrestal is moving to his new offices in the newly-designated National Defense Building (formerly the Pentagon). No decision has as yet been made with regard to other agencies who might be moved to the National Defense Building.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:

Captain Ford stated that the Monthly Progress Reports of the Branches are being circulated to the other Branch chiefs -- their circulation, however, should be limited to the Branch chiefs only and should not go to the lower levels.

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Documents

**Document 2**

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## GENERAL

1. Embassy Moscow's analysis of Stalin interview--US Embassy Moscow, in commenting on the 16 February Stalin interview in Pravda, expresses the view that the most significant aspect of the interview is the discussion of the inevitability of war. Pointing out that Stalin declared war can become inevitable if "the deception practiced by warmongers" is successful, the Embassy remarks that this constitutes a notice to the Soviet people and others that war is a possibility.

The Embassy considers that the interview as a whole may have been calculated to: (a) establish a favorable popular attitude toward the Soviet position prior to the prospective CFM exploratory talks; (b) give new momentum to the "peace drive" on the eve of the World Peace Council meeting; (c) demonstrate the "reasonable-ness and righteousness" of Soviet policy for the benefit of peoples in the Soviet orbit and wavering Communists abroad; (d) nourish popular dissatisfaction in the West over the economic burdens of rearmament; and (e). widen the split now evident in the UN between Asiatic and NATO countries.

The Embassy comments that in this interview Stalin has permitted his reputation for superior wisdom to become involved in much more sophistry than previously. This may reflect a greater degree of Soviet vulnerability on the issues involved; it may reveal a feeling on the part of Soviet leaders that Stalin's authority is the margin needed to assure popular support abroad for Soviet foreign policy; or it may reflect a Soviet belief that Stalin's intervention will cause sufficient confusion to pave the way for success in any adventure to be undertaken in the near future.

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THE C. I. A. HAS NO OBJECTION  
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF  
THIS DOCUMENT.

No. 31 MAR 1978

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*Document***Document 2 (continued)**

Looking at the question of what strategy is desirable for the US and the "free world," in the light of Stalin's pronouncements, the Embassy observes that Stalin has attempted to regain a measure of the diplomatic initiative wrested from him through effective inauguration of a Western defense program and that it is consequently important that the program be continued vigorously.

**EUROPE**

2. YUGOSLAVIA: Tito warns Communists to accept policy-- US Embassy Belgrade, in commenting on a speech by Tito before a Communist Party group, notes that Tito warned Yugoslav Communists to accept Yugoslav foreign policy and declared that dissension on this point "would not be tolerated." The Embassy observes that there is probably a minority among Yugoslav Communists who find it difficult to accept a Yugoslav-Western rapprochement and that this speech was aimed at such elements. The Embassy has long felt some danger that Tito, in reorienting the Yugoslav Government toward the West, might get too far ahead of the Communist Party. It is now apparent that the Party leadership is aware of the problem and has taken steps to meet it.

**FAR EAST**

3. CHINA: Reported Russian military control in Peiping-- The US Air Attaché in Taipei transmits a report from a source in Peiping that Russian officials there called a meeting on 6 February of the Chinese responsible for

*Documents*

**Document 2 (continued)**

garrison control of the Peiping area and told the Chinese that the military control in the Peiping area was too weak. The Chinese Commander reportedly stood up to defend his position and was told to sit down and shut up. According to this report, the Chinese were then told that a Russian Commander would give orders in the Peiping area in the future. The Chinese made no open protest but deeply resent such control by the Russians.

Source also reported that several Chinese representatives who returned to Peiping from the recent Moscow Conference said that the Korean cease-fire discussions have closed, with the conclusion that no further cease-fire proposal will be presented to the UN.

Document 3

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

U. S. Naval Station,  
Key West, Florida,  
March 6, 1961.

Dear Bedell:

I have been reading the  
Intelligence Bulletin and I am  
highly impressed with it.

I believe you have hit  
the jackpot with this one.

Sincerely,



General Walter B. Smith,  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency,  
Washington 25, D. C.